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The courts have established that structured dismissals are permissible under the
Bankruptcy Code.3 Opponents to structured dismissals argue they provide fewer protections for
creditors because they frequently deviate from the priority scheme of section 507 or violate the
absolute priority rule of section 1129.4 While some courts have held the protections of section
507 and section 11295 do not apply to structured dismissals, there is a clear need for some
standard of review to ensure that structured dismissals do not result in inequitable treatment of
creditors. To ensure protection, courts have established that structured dismissals must be fair
and equitable..6 However, this leaves a lingering issue – courts must decide what fair and
equitable means in the context of structured dismissals. This issue remains unclear as only one
court has found a deviation from the priority scheme and absolute priority rule to be fair and
equitable.7
Structured dismissals are simply an agreement among parties to a case to resolve that
case, but with lingering requirements.8 The result of a structured dismissal is that when the judge
approves the dismissal, the case is actually not completely over until all the lingering
requirements are met.9 Opponents’ biggest issue with structured dismissals is that they are not
required to conform with the priority scheme and the absolute priority rule because neither apply
3

Id. at 181.
Id. at 182-83.
5
See generally United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO), 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th. Cir.
1984) (“Our understanding of bankruptcy law’s underlying policies leads us to make a limited
extension of the fair and equitable standard: a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion in approving
a settlement with a junior creditor unless the court concludes that priority payment will be
respected as to objecting senior creditors.”); contra Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating, LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 446 (2nd Cir. 2007); see
also In re Jevic Holding, 787 F.3d at 179.
6
In re Jevic Holding, 787 F.3d at 184.
7
In re Jevic Holding, 787 F.3d at 183.
8
See generally 15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, §18.95 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2009).
9
See generally id.
4
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to settlements of a case, which is what a structured dismissal is classified as. 10 However, this
issue is not completely resolved.
To date, three circuit courts have addressed the issue of whether the priority rules apply
to structured dismissals. In In re AWECO, the Fifth Circuit held that the priority scheme and
absolute priority rule must be applied to all structured dismissals.11 However, in In re Iridium,
the Second Circuit held that it is permissible for structured dismissals to deviate from the priority
rules if there are specific and credible grounds, but the court there failed to find those grounds in
the Iridium case.12 Finally, the Third Circuit in In re Jevic agreed with the Iridium court, finding
that structured dismissals not in conformance with the priority rules are permissible in some
circumstances, and the court found those circumstances were present in the Jevic case.13
While the Circuits are split, causing uncertainty for the future, the Iridium and Jevic
courts do agree that structured dismissals not in conformance with the priority rules are
permissible in certain rare circumstances: when the dismissal is fair and equitable, in spite of its
failure to conform to the priority rules.14 The Iridum and Jevic courts applied the Martin multifactor test to determine when a non-conforming settlement will be fair and equitable.15 As of
now, it seems a structured dismissal not in conformance with the priority rules will be
permissible only when the debtor’s assets are so diminished that there is virtually no chance of
success for the creditors in litigation, and therefore the interests of the creditors are best served
through the dismissal so as to not further diminish the debtor’s assets.16

10

See In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 182-83.
In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298.
12
In re Iridium Operating, 478 F.3d at 464-65.
13
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184.
14
See id.
15
Martin v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996).
16
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 182-184.
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While there is uncertainty surrounding structured dismissals, they are becoming
increasingly popular and it is likely more courts will be addressing this issue in the future,
hopefully leading to greater certainty. As the law currently stands, if the court does allow for a
structured dismissal deviating from the priority rules - which will be rare as the priority rules are
usually dispositive - the dismissal must be fair and equitable.17
Structured Dismissals
A structured dismissal is a “dismissal of a chapter 11 case, but with additional
provisions.”18 These additional provisions include fixing claims resolution procedures, approving
gifting and “providing that certain orders entered during the case remain in effect and impose
other conditions which must be met before the effectiveness of any dismissal.”19 The court in In
re Jevic described structured dismissals as “simply dismissals that are preceded by other orders
of the bankruptcy court (e.g., orders approving settlements, granting releases, and so forth) that
remain in effect after dismissal.”20
The key difference between structured dismissals and ordinary dismissals described in
the Bankruptcy Code is that ordinary dismissals “typically reinstate the pre-petition state of
affairs by revesting property in the debtor and vacating orders and judgments of the bankruptcy
court.”21 However, the Bankruptcy Code also expressly provides that the court can, for cause,
grant otherwise.22 Cause simply means “an acceptable reason.”23 Thus, while structured
dismissals are not expressly permitted under the Bankruptcy Code, they are in conformance with
17

Id. at 184.
15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, §18.95 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2009).
19
Id.
20
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 181.
21
Id. at 181; see also 11 U.S.C. §349 (2012).
22
11 U.S.C. §349.
23
In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991).
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the Bankruptcy Code, as long as the court ordering the structured dismissal has an acceptable
reason for doing so.
Issues with Structured Dismissals
While structured dismissals themselves are permissible under the Bankruptcy Code,
opponents of structured dismissals still have grounds to challenge them, if the structured
dismissals are not in compliance with other portions of the Bankruptcy Code.
One issue with structured dismissals is they “typically lack the protections offered by the
chapter 11 plan process” including the “absence of application of the ‘fair and equitable’
standard for the treatment of claims and of the absolute priority rule.”24 According to the
Supreme Court in TMT Trailer Ferry, “a bankruptcy court is not to approve or confirm a plan of
reorganization unless it is found to be ‘fair and equitable.’”25 This concept of “fair and
equitable” plan conformations was codified in 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and is referred to as
the “absolute priority rule.”26
Under section 1129(b)(2), “the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to
a class includes the following requirements …(B)(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is
junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior claims or interest any property….”27 In essence, in order for a plan to be fair and
equitable, the claims of junior creditors cannot be paid before the claims of senior creditors.

24

15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, §18.95 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2009).
25
Protective Comm. for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390
U.S. 414, 442 (1968).
26
11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
27
11 U.S.C. §1129(b) (2012).
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Another issue with structured dismissals is they may “approve distribution of assets
without due regard to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.”28 Bankruptcy Code section
103(a) states that “chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13
of this title.”29 Section 507 is, of course, within chapter 5 and there is an argument to be made
that section 507 applies to all cases filed under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13.30 It would follow from
that argument that section 507 applies to all structured dismissals filed under chapter 7, 11, 12,
and 13.31 If this argument was the rule, no deviations from the priority scheme of section 507
would be permissible.
Permissibility of Structured Dismissals Not in Compliance with the Priority Rules
The requirements for plan confirmations have been made abundantly clear, both by the
Supreme Court and Congress, through the absolute priority rule.32 Simply put, in the context of
plan confirmations, no creditor with a junior claim may be paid before a creditor with a senior
claim.33 However, a structured dismissal is a settlement, not a plan confirmation and as such, the
rules for structured dismissals are much less clear.
The absolute priority rule specifically applies to plan confirmations, not settlements.34 As
such, the term “fair and equitable” is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code in the context of
settlements. In fact, the requirement that settlements be “fair and equitable” is not even expressed

28

15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, §18.95 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2009).
29
11 U.S.C. §103(a) (2012).
30
See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 182 (explanation of the Driver’s, appellants from a
structured dismissal not in conformance with §507, argument that §507 applies to all chapter 11
cases).
31
Id. at 182.
32
See TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 442; 11 U.S.C. §1129(b).
33
See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b).
34
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 183.
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in the Bankruptcy Code. However, the requirement that settlements be “fair and equitable” does
exist, under Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.35
Rule 9019 is intended to “prevent the making of concealed agreements which are
unknown to the creditor and unevaluated by the court.”36 In order to fulfill this intention, courts
have developed a set of factors used to determine whether settlements are “fair and equitable.”37
In In re Martin, the Third Circuit looked to the following factors: ‘‘(1) the probability of success
in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation involved,
and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest
of the creditors.”38 Thus, structured dismissals not in conformance with the absolute priority rule
are permissible, as long as they are in conformance with the In re Martin multi-factor test.
However, while it is clear that the absolute priority rule does not apply to settlements, the
priority scheme of section 507 is less clear. While there is, as mentioned above, an argument to
be made that section 507 applies to all structured dismissals, this argument is far from
established law. As the court of In re Jevic notes, “[i]f § 103(a) meant that all distributions in
Chapter 11 cases must comply with the priorities of Section 507, there would have been no need
for Congress to codify the absolute priority rule specifically in the plan confirmation context.”39
Thus, whether a settlement may be approved turns not on its conformance with the priority
scheme, but only on whether it is “fair and equitable,” as that standard has been interpreted in the
context of settlements through the In re Martin multi-factor test.40
When is a Structured Dismissal Fair and Equitable?
35

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019.
In re Masters, 141 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1992).
37
Martin v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996).
38
Id.
39
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 182 n.7.
40
In re Martin, 91 F.3d at 393.
36
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The circuit courts have decided only three cases addressing when, or if, a structured
dismissal is fair and equitable, in spite of deviating from the priority scheme of section 507.41
Each of these cases had different outcomes, causing continued uncertainty in the circuits as to
whether a structured dismissal can be fair and equitable while noncompliant with section 507,
and if so, when.42
The purpose of section 507 is to ensure “the even handed and predictable treatment of
creditors.”43 The same underlying policy applies to settlements and courts will typically consider
whether the priority scheme under section 507 is being followed in determining whether or not
the settlement is fair and equitable.44 However, because the statutes and precedents do not
require strict conformance with the priority scheme, if a bankruptcy court has “specific and
credible grounds to justify … deviation” they may approve nonconforming settlements.45
The first circuit court to address whether structured dismissals may deviate from the
priority rules was the Fifth Circuit in In re AWECO. In In re AWECO, the Fifth Circuit adopted a
strict approach and held that section 507 must be followed in all cases.46 The Fifth Circuit
therefore rejected a structured dismissal not in conformance with the priority rules.47
The next circuit court to evaluate the acceptance of structured dismissals deviating from
the priority rules was the Second Circuit in In re Iridium. While the Second Circuit took a less

41

In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 183.
Compare In re AWECO, 725 F.2d 293 (where the court held non-complaint structured
dismissals could never be fair and equitable); with In re Iridium Operating, 478 F.3d 452 (where
the court held structured dismissals deviating are permissible in theory, but the facts in the case
did not support one); and In re Jevic, 787 F.3d 173 (where the court approved a structured
dismissal deviating from the priority scheme).
43
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184.
44
Id. (citing In re Iridium Operating, 478 F.3d at 455).
45
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184 (citing In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 466).
46
See In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298.
47
Id.
42
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severe approach in deciding In re Iridium, the court still failed to approve a structured dismissal
that did not follow section 507, holding that while it may be permissible to circumvent section
507 in rare circumstances, the priorities will usually be dispositive of whether the proposed
settlement is fair and equitable.48 In Iridium, the Second Circuit was denied the opportunity to
evaluate whether the priority rules were dispositive in the case before it because the record
provided no factual reason for the violation of the priority rule.49
The most recent circuit court to evaluate the permissibility of structured dismissals
deviating from the priority rules was the Third Circuit in In re Jevic. While Jevic closely
followed the analysis of In re Iridium, In re Jevic offered the first example of “specific and
credible grounds”50 sufficient to justify the deviation,51 which were grounded in the multifactor
test of In re Martin for evaluating settlements.52 Through its analysis of the In re Martin
multifactor test, the Jevic bankruptcy court determined that the factors mandated the approval of
the settlement.53 The Jevic bankruptcy court decided that traditional routes out of chapter 11
were not available, and the settlement in question best served the creditors and the estate.54
Interestingly, the Drivers (creditors protesting the structured dismissal) agreed with this
contention arguing that even if the creditors and estate were best served, it was irrelevant because

48

In re Iridium Operating, 478 F.3d at 464-65.
Id. at 466.
50
Id. at 466.
51
In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184–85 (“we concluded that the Bankruptcy Court had sufficient
reason to approve the settlement and structured dismissal of Jevic’s Chapter 11 case.”).
52
Id. at 180 (“we gleaned from TMT Trailer Ferry four factors to guide bankruptcy courts in this
regard: ‘(1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in collection; (3) the
complexity of the litigation involved and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily
attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the creditors.’”) (citing In re Martin, 91 F.3d at
393).
53
See generally In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 179.
54
Id. at 186.
49
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the Bankruptcy Code did not permit the settlement’s approval.55 However, the court found that
if the way to best serve the creditors and the estate is a settlement not in conformance with
section 507, then that settlement may be approved.56
While the In re Jevic court allowed a deviation from section 507, it also warned these
were rare circumstances in which a court would approve a settlement plan not conforming with
section 507.57 However, the criteria to meet these rare circumstances does not seem as strenuous
as the Third Circuit implies.58 The In re Jevic court allowed a deviation because it was best for
the estate and the creditors;59 in essence, because the In re Martin multifactor test favored
settlement, the deviation was permissible.60
There is still disagreement among the circuits with some enforcing a per se rule that
section 507 applies to settlements.61 Until more decisions involving structured dismissals not in
conformance with section 507 are handed down, there is no clear answer as to whether or not
structured dismissals must comply with section 507.
Conclusion
While not expressly allowed in the Bankruptcy Code, structured dismissals have been
approved by courts as in conformance with the Bankruptcy Code. Structured dismissals become
more complicated when they are used as a means to avoid protections or requirements that other
forms of case resolution, such as plan confirmations, have. The increasingly popular structured
dismissals are therefore becoming increasingly contentious as they are used to skirt the

55

See id. at 180.
Id. at 186.
57
Id. at 186.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See Id.
61
In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298.
56
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requirements of the priority rules of section 507 and section 1129. However, while the Second
and Third Circuits have held that structured dismissals do not have to comply with the priority
rules, the Fifth Circuit held that any structured dismissals not in conformance with the priority
rules are per se invalid.62 Further, although the Second and Third Circuits have held that
structured dismissals may deviate from the priority rules in theory, in reality they have only
upheld one such deviating structured dismissal.63 Further, the Second and Third Circuits make
clear that structured dismissals are still required to be fair and equitable and that the priority rules
will usually be dispositive as to whether or not a structured dismissal is fair and equitable.64
Because only one Circuit case upholding a structured dismissal not in conformance with the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority rules has been decided, there is still ambiguity as to how rare these
deviations will be and exactly what is required for the courts to allow them. In November, 2015,
the losing creditors in Jevic filed a writ for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.65 If
certiorari is granted, hopefully the ambiguity about the application of the priority rules to
structured dismissals will be resolved.

62

See id.
See In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 179-184.
64
See In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 184.
65
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., (3d Cir. 2015), petition of cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3475
(U.S. Nov. 17, 2015) (No. 15-649).
63

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

